COMMENTS
AFTER RIDGEFIELD PARK AND
STATE SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES:
THE SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN
THE PUBLIC SECTOR OF NEW JERSEY
Historically, public sector employees have been treated differently in regard to collective negotiations than have their private sector counterparts. I This difference in treatment is based on the recognition that local government, unlike the private employer, "may
not legally delegate any of its authority as to matters properly within
its legislative discretion as defined by charter or by statute nor abdicate any of its responsibility to private parties." 2 In the private sector, a refusal to bargain over a particular subject matter by one party
may invite an unfair labor practice charge from the other party. 3 In
the public sector, however, the public employer may refuse to bargain on the ground that the subject matter raised during contract
negotiations is outside its authority to delegate, and therefore is not
negotiable. 4
The rights of public sector employees were virtually non-existent
until the 1950s. 5 Over the past two decades, however, it has been
generally recognized that public employees have a right to organize
and join labor unions, 6 while management has been deemed to have

' See, e.g., the Wagner Act of 1935, which developed a comprehensive scheme for collective bargaining in the private sector, but specifically exempted public employees from coverage.
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). Section 2(2) specifically excluded the
United States government from the definition of employer. Id. § 2(2) 49 Stat. at 450.
2 Kilberg, Appropriate Subjects for Bargaining in Local Government Labor Relations, 30
MD. L. REV. 179, 183 (1970). Fearful that in the give-and-take of the bargaining process a
significant issue of the public interest may be sacrificed to achieve industrial peace, the public
employer has been prohibited from negotiating in some areas absent specific statutory or constitutional authority. For a further discussion of this concept, see notes 181-82 infra and accompanying text.
3 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), (b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), (b)(3) (1976). See note 1
supra.
' See notes 126-66 infra and accompanying text.
5 As previously noted, public employees were specifically exempted from the National
Labor Relations Act. See note 1 supra. In addition, most courts had found that public
employees did not have a constitutional right to join or form unions and, as a corollary, that
legislatures could specifically forbid the joining or forming of unions. See Local 201, AFSCME
v. City of Muskegon, 369 Mich. 384, 120 N.W.2d 197, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963), where
the court held that the regulation which prohibited police officers from being members of any
federation or labor union did not deprive the officers of any constitutional rights.
I See, e.g., Lontine v. Van Cleave, 483 F.2d 966, 967--68 (10th Cir. 1968). Much of the.
force behind the change came from President Kennedy's Executive Order 10,988, which
granted federal employees the right to form organizations for the purpose of employee represen-
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the corresponding duty to bargain with the employees' chosen representative. 7 In 1968, the New Jersey Legislature followed the trend
of extending greater rights to public employees by enacting the New
Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, 8 a comprehensive statute
concerning public sector labor relations. This statute provided certain
protections to public sector employees, 9 established the Public
Employment Relations Commission (PERC) to deal with various
problems encountered in public sector employment, 10 and required
public sector employers to negotiate with employees regarding "terms
and conditions" of employment. 11 The statute, however, did not
provide a workable definition for "terms and conditions" of employment and failed to address the validity of agreements on subjects
other than "terms and conditions."1 2 In addition, the statute did not
specify the proper limitations on collective negotiations which are undeniably necessary in light of the inherent limitations in the public
employer's authority to negotiate. 13 In 1974, the New Jersey Legislature amended the 1968 Act, but again failed to specify the proper
limitations on collective negotiations. 14 Recent New Jersey supreme
court decisions have addressed these problems and have attempted to
give further meaning to the 1974 amendments. This comment will
tation. Employee Management Cooperation in the Federal Service, Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3
C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963).
7 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Delaware River Bay
Auth. v. International Organization, 45 N.J. 138, 211 A.2d 789 (1965), where the court held
that public employees have full collective bargaining rights, but under no circumstances are
they permitted the right to strike. Id. at 142, 211 A.2d at 791.
8 Ch. 303, 1968 N.J. Laws 891 (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-1 to -13
(West 1968 & Cum. Supp. 1979)).
9 The Act statutorily granted public employees the right to meet "freely and without fear of
penalty or reprisal, to form, join and assist any employee organization or to refrain from any
such activity." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West 1968). In addition, the Act provided a
mechanism for the resolution of unfair labor practices. N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:13A-54.4 (West
1968). For a discussion of unfair labor practices under this Act, see Tener, The Public Employment Relations Commission, The First Decade, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 609 (1978).
10 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.2 (West 1968). For a discussion of PERC's function, see
notes 18-20 infra and accompanying text and Tener, supra note 9, at 611-50.
11 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West 1968).
12 Id.
13 These limitations have been described,by Professors Wellington and Winter as the "doctrine of illegal delegation of power." Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining
in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1101, 1109 (1969). The authors observed that the doctrine
"commands that certain discretionary decisions be made solely on the basis of the judgment of a
designated official. Id. Any delegation of this authority would be in contravention of the public
official's duties, and the grant of power illegal. Id. at 1111.
14 Ch. 123, 1974 N.J. Laws 560 (amending N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:13A-1 to -13 (West 1968));
see notes 48-52 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the amendments and their effect
on the scope of regulation in New Jersey.
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discuss the effect of these decisions on the statute while presenting
the history and current status of the scope of negotiations in the public sector of New Jersey.
The original version of the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, 15 known as the Chapter 303 Law, 16 extended the rights
of collective representation to public employees by providing a
scheme for mandatory negotiation in the public sector. 17 But
perhaps the most significant aspect of this legislation was the establishment of PERC to "[m]ake policy and establish rules and regulations concerning employer-employee relations in public employment
relating to dispute settlement, grievance procedures and administration including enforcement of statutory provisions concerning representative election and related matters .... " 8 PERC's powers included mediation, recommendation of fact-finding, and the holding of
conferences and formal hearings. 19 As a result of the establishment
of PERC, the duties of the Commissioner of Education, who was
previously given broad power to hear and determine "all controversies and disputes arising under the school laws," were substantially

diminished. 20
In regard to negotiations between public employers and
employees, the legislature implicitly limited the Act's scope by au-

15 Ch. 303, 1968 N.J. Laws 891 (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-1 to -13 (West
1968 & Cum. Supp. 1979-1980)). In order to enact this bill, the legislature had to override a
conditional veto by Governor Richard J. Hughes. See Veto Messages of Hon. Richard J.
Hughes, Governor of New Jersey 221 (Sept. 10, 1968). This act provided the framework for
implementing the applicable provisions of article 1, paragraph 19 of the New Jersey Constitution which provides that:
Persons in private employment shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively. Persons in public employment shall have the right to organize, present to
and make known to the state, or any of its political subdivisions or agencies, their
grievances ard proposals through representatives of their own choosing.
N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 19. In interpreting this section of the constitution, New Jersey courts
have consistently held that it does not give public employees the right to strike. See, e.g., In re
Educ. Ass'n, 117 N.J. Super. 255, 261-62, 284 A.2d 374, 377-78 (App. Div. 1971), certif.
denied, 60 N.J. 198, 287 A.2d 458 (1972) (holding defendant education association in contempt
of'court for violating order enjoining strike).
16 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. New Jersey Educ. Ass'n, 53 N.J. 29, 46-47 (1968).
17 This scheme was embodied in section 34:13A-5.3, which requires that the public
employer meet with the representative of the public employees and negotiate over "the terms
and conditions of employment of the employees in such unit." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3
(West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
Is Id. For a further discussion of PERC's functions under Chapter 303, see Tener, supra
note 9, at 64-73.
19 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
20 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-9 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). See notes 53-59 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Commissioner of Education's duties.
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thorizing employers and employees to meet at reasonable times and
"negotiate in good faith with respect to grievances and terms
and
z
conditions of employment."'
The only other guideline in the statute concerning the scope of negotiations prohibited modification of
any existing agreement or New Jersey statute. 22 Because the legislature did not specifically set forth certain subjects as negotiable under
Chapter 303, the courts of New Jersey were left the responsibility of
establishing which issues were "terms and conditions" and hence
negotiable and which were beyond the scope of negotiation. 23
The Supreme Court of New Jersey first addressed the issue of
what subjects are negotiable under Chapter 303 in Lullo v. Fire
Fighters Local 1066.24 The court in Lullo was principally concerned
with the constitutionality of the Act. 25 Recognizing the distinction
between the public and private sectors, the court suggested that
there are some areas which were beyond the lawful authority of thepublic employer to negotiate. The court noted that "[t]he authorization for 'collective negotiations' in the 1968 Act was designed to make
known that there are salient differences between public and private
employment relations which necessarily affect the characteristics of
collective bargaining in the public sector." 26 The court, however,
27
failed to specify what specific subjects were nonnegotiable.
In the next set of cases, commonly known as the Dunellen Trilogy, 2 8 the supreme court established the parameters for determining
21
22

N.J.

STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
The statute specifically provided:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to annul-or modify, or to preclude the
removal or continuation of any agreement during its current term heretofore en.
tered into between any public employer and employee organization, nor shall any
provision hereof annul or modify any statute or statutes of this State.

Id.

Id.
23 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Englewood Teachers Ass'n, 64 N.J. 1, 311 A.2d 729 (1973),
where the court noted that, although mentioned in the statute, "[t]he lines [of what constitutes
a term and condition of employment] are obscure and, pending further definitive legislation,
they must be drawn case by case." Id. at 7, 311 A.2d at 732.
24 55 N.J. 409, 262 A.2d 681 (1970). In Lullo, an employee of the Jersey City Fire Department challenged the selection of the International Association of Fire Fighters as the majority
representative of the department, arguing that this selection deprived him of the right to be
represented by an organization of his own choice. Id. at 420, 262 A.2d at 687. The court found
this argument to be unpersuasive, and held that the legislature was allowed to provide for
exclusive representation by an employee organization. Id. at 430, 262 A.2d at 692.
25 Id. at 430, 262 A.2d at 692.
26 Id. at 440, 262 A.2d at 698.
27 Id. at 441, 262 A.2d at 698. Instead, the court mentioned that a gradual development
based upon "decisions both by PERC and the courts awaiting presentation of individual problems" would be in harmony with the legislative intent of the Act. Id.
28 Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d 737 (1973); Burlington County College Faculty Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 64 N.J. 10, 311 A.2d 733 (1973);
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what subjects are negotiable under the Chapter 303 laws. In Dunellen
Board of Education v. Dunellen Education Association,2 9 the court
held that a school board's decision to consolidate a local high school's
humanities and social studies department's chairmanships did not
amount to a negotiable term and condition of employment. 30 Speaking for the court, Justice Jacobs reasoned that the decision to consolidate was "predominantly a matter of educational policy which had no
effect, or at most only a remote and incidental effect, on the 'terms
and conditions of employment.' "31 The test established in Dunellen
to determine if an item is within the category of "terms and conditions" was found to be "those matters which intimately and directly
affect the work and welfare" of the teachers' group. 32 Those items
which only indirectly affected teachers' working conditions were
deemed nonnegotiable and remained decisions to be made by local
school boards or state commissions. 3 Expanding these guidelines,
the court also declared that matters which "fall exclusively within
management's prerogatives . .. would not be subject to compulsory
34
negotiation."

Board of Educ. v. Englewood Teachers Ass'n, 64 N.J. 1, 311 A.2d 729 (1973). Although not the
first supreme court cases which interpreted the Act, see, e.g., Burlington County Evergreen
Park Mental Hospital v. Cooper, 56 N.J. 579, 267 A.2d 533 (1970); Lullo v. Fire Fighters Local
1066, 55 N.J. 409, 262 A.2d 681 (1970), these decisions have become the accepted standard for
determining which issues are appropriate for negotiations under Chapter 303. The Dunellen
Trilogy consists of three separate decisions, all decided on the same day.
29 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d 737 (1973). For a further analysis of Dunellen's impact, see Scope of
Collective Bargaining in Public Education: Defining Terms and Conditions of Employment, 28
RUT. L. REV. 468 (1974).
30 64 N.J. at 31, 311 A.2d at 744.
31 Id. at 29, 311 A.2d at 743.
32 Id. at 25, 311 A.2d at 742.
33 Id. at 31, 311 A.2d at 743. The court in Dunellen agreed with a Nebraska supreme court
decision, which held that the scope of negotiations does not include matters which were predominantly concerns of educational policy, management prerogatives or statutory duties of the
public employer. School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 188 Neb. 772, 774-75,
199 N.W.2d 752, 754 (1972). The management prerogatives mentioned by the court included
the right to hire, to maintain order and efficiency; to schedule work; to control
transfers and assignments; to determine which extra-curricular activities may be
supported or sponsored; and to determine the curriculum, class size and types of
specialists to be employed.
Id. at 784, 199 N.W.2d at 759.
34 64 N.J. at 26, 311 A.2d at 741. In the decision, the court also referred to the duties of
the Commissioner of Education, finding it illegal to submit to arbitration matters which concerned major educational policy: "so far as our educational laws are concerned, it is equally
clear that the Commissioner ha[s] an overall responsibility for supervising such educational determinations .. . and for hearing controversies and disputes with respect thereto as 'arising
under the school laws.' " Id. at 30, 311 A.2d at 743 (citations omitted).
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Applying the Dunellen guidelines, the supreme court, in Burlington County College Faculty Association v. Board of Trustees,35
found that control over a college calendar by its board of trustees was
a matter of educational policy and therefore beyond the mandatory
scope of negotiations. 36 Following the Dunellen approach, the court
found the college calendar to be an educational policy because of its
interrelationship with the budget. 37 Although recognizing the practical effect that a calendar might have on faculty working conditions,
the court nevertheless concluded that the board of education had
properly refused negotiations and arbitration. 38 As in Dunellen, the
Burlington court held that there was a required category of negotiations, and approved the trustees' decision to negotiate such subjects
as compensation, hours and sick leave. 39
In the final case of the Dunellen Trilogy, Board of Education v.
Englewood Teachers Association, 40 the court expanded the list of
negotiable items under Chapter 303 by including working hours and
4
compensation as negotiable terms and conditions of employment. '
Justice Jacobs authored the unanimous opinion which reversed the
lower court's finding that a change in working conditions without
compensation did not violate the parties' collective bargaining agreement. 42 The court ruled that the legislature had clearly intended
that hours and compensation, along with physical arrangements and

35 64 N.J. 10, 311 A.2d 733 (1973).
36 Id. at 13, 311 A.2d at 735. The decision in Burlington reversed the law division's finding
that the Board was required to negotiate the college calendar with the plaintiff's chosen representative. Burlington County College Faculty Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 119 N.J. Super.
276, 286, 291 A.2d 150, 155 (Law Div. 1972), rev'd, 64 N.J. 10, 311 A.2d 733 (1973). In holding
the calendar to be subject to mandatory negotiation, the lower court emphasized the calendar's
impact in determining the time period of the teacher's performance. Id. at 283, 291 A.2d at
153.
37 64 N.J. at 13, 311 A.2d at 735.
38 Id. at 16, 311 A.2d at 736. The court also suggested that the Board of Trustees should
have considerable influence over the county college's internal affairs. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
18A:64-11, -12 (West 1968), which sets forth the powers and the general responsibilities of the
Board of Trustees.
39 64 N.J. at 14, 311 A.2d at 735.
40 64 N.J. 1, 311 A.2d 729 (1973).
41 Id. at 8-9, 311 A.2d at 733. The education association argued that the Board breached
the contract when it unilaterally altered the working hours of some teachers, denied reimbursement to a teacher for graduate course tuition and refused to place a teacher on a higher
pay scale when that teacher received his master's degree. Id. at 4-6, 311 A.2d at 730-31.
42 Id. at 8, 311 A.2d at 733. The court stressed the narrowness of its holding, finding that
the contractual "interpretations would directly and most intimately affect the employment terms
and conditions of the five individuals involved without affecting any major educational policies."
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facilities, would be within the scope of terms and conditions, and
therefore negotiable and subject to arbitration. 43
Thus, under the Dunellen test, the public employer was required
to "negotiat[e] in good faith with representatives of their employees
with respect to those matters which intimately and directly affect the
work and welfare of their employees."- 44 Additionally, even if an
item qualified as a term and condition under Dunellen, it was
deemed to be nonnegotiable if an agreement on it would "contravene
any other statute of the State."-4 5 Furthermore, the court expressed
reluctance to expand the scope of negotiations approved in Dunellen:
"[t]he lines between the negotiable and the nonnegotiable will often
be shadowy and the legislative reference to 'terms and conditions of
employment' without further definition hardly furnishes any dispositive guideline." 4 6 Although subsequent cases discussed the scope of
negotiations under Chapter 303, the Dunellen Trilogy established the
guidelines that other courts used. 47
Severely dissatisfied with the restrictive limitations on the scope
of negotiations, employee groups lobbied to alter the scope of
negotiability in New Jersey. 48 In 1974, the legislature responded by
passing Senate Bill No. 1087.49 The significant changes in regard to
43Id. at 8-9, 311 A.2d at 733.
44 64 N.J. at 25, 311 A.2d at 741.
45 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-8.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). The statute expressly protects existing provisions of other statutes and thus pre-empts the applicability of the Act.
46 64 N.J. at 25, 311 A.2d at 741. It was further held that the court would interpret the Act
narrowly until the legislature provided more definitive guidelines. Id. Likewise, in Burlington,
the court found that, absent "clear and distinct" legislative expression, "the sounder judicial
course is to hold . .. that the college calendar is not a proper subject of mandatory negotiation. . .. ." 64 N.J. at 16, 311 A.2d at 736.
47 See, e.g., Association of New Jersey State College Faculties v. Dungan, 64 N.J. 338, 316
A.2d 425 (1974) (guidelines from Board of Education on tenure decisions not subject to mandatory negotiation); Rutgers Council v. New Jersey Bd. of Higher Educ., 126 N.J. Super. 53, 312
A.2d 677 (App. Div. 1973) (student facility and college calendar not mandatorily negotiable);
Prosecutor's Detectives, Essex County v. Hudson County Bd. of Freeholders, 130 N.J. Super.
30, 324 A.2d 897 (App. Div. 1974), certif. denied, 66 N.J. 330, 331 A.2d 30 (1974) (compensation for overtime is mandatorily negotiable).
48 See generally Dorf, The New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act--How Senate Bill
1087 (Chapter 123) Affects Municipalities, N.J. MUNICIPALITIES, Jan. 1975. Governor Brendan
Byrne's proposal to increase the scope of negotiability in the public sector was introduced as
S. 1087, 196th Legis., 1st Sess. (1974).
49 The final version of the bill was passed by the Senate on June 17, 1974 after the original
bill was twice amended. See Newark Star Ledger, June 18, 1974, at 1, col. 1. As originally
introduced, the bill contained the words "nor shall any provision hereof annul or modify any
statute or statutes of this State." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-8.1 (West 1968). These words were
replaced by the following language:
Nothing in this act shall be construed to annul the duty, responsibility or authority
vested by statute in any public employer or public body except that the impact on
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negotiability were evidenced in New Jersey Statutes Annotated sections 34:13A-5.3 and 34:13A-8.1. These sections, under which the
employee groups hoped to expand the scope of negotiability, contained changes in the grievance procedure mechanism included in the
employee's contract and the addition of the word "pension" to the
scope of negotiation provision of the statute. 50 In addition, the
amendments authorized PERC's primary jurisdiction to determine if
a particular subject matter is within the scope of negotiability. 5 1 As

terms and conditions of employment of a public employer's or a public body's decisions in the exercise of that duty, responsibility or authority shall be within the
scope of collective negotiations.
S. 1087, 196th Legis., 1st Sess. 6 (1974). After this version met with considerable controversy,
the Senate Conference and Coordinating Committee suggesting this section be replaced with
the following management rights clause:
It is the right of any public employer to determine the standards of services to be
offered; determine school and college curricula; determine the standards of selection
for employment; direct its employees; take disciplinary action; maintain the efficiency of operations; determine the methods, means and personnel by which operations are to be conducted; determine the content of job classifications; take all
necessary actions to carry out its mission in emergencies; and exercise complete
control and discretion over its organization and the technology of performing its
work. Decisions of any public employer on the aforesaid matters are not within the
scope of collective negotiations; provided, however, that questions concerning the
practical impact that decisions on said matters have on employees, such as questions
of workload or manning, are within the scope of collective negotiations.
Id. The Senate voted, however, to delete this language and adopted the present language which
Governor Byrne signed into law on October 21, 1974. See Newark Star Ledger, Oct. 22, 1974,
at 20, col. 2.
50 The final amended version of the statutes, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
Public employers shall negotiate written policies setting forth grievance procedures
by means of which their employees or representatives of employees may appeal the
interpretation, application or violation of policies, agreements, and administrative
decisions affecting them, provided that such grievance procedures shall be included
in any agreement entered into between the public employer and the representative
organization. Such grievance procedures may provide for binding arbitration as a
means for resolving disputes. Notwithstanding any procedures for the resolution of
disputes, controversies or grievances established by any other statute, grievance
procedures established by agreement between the public employer and the representative organizations shall be utilized for any dispute covered by the terms of
such agreement.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) and
Nothing in this act shall be construed to annul or modify, or to preclude the continuation of any agreement during its current term heretofore entered into between
any public employer and any employee organization, nor shall any provision hereof
annul or modify any pension statute or statutes of this State.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-8.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). This final version of S. 1087 also
encountered criticism. See, Is It Goodbye, Civil Service?, 97 N.J.L.J. 364 (1974); Hayes, Some
Projected Consequences of Those Amendments, 97 N.J.L.J. 1002, 1003 (1974).
51 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.4(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). This statute reads in
pertinent part:
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these amendments directly involved the statutory language relied on
they were
by the New Jersey supreme court in the Dunellen Trilogy,
52
statute.
the
of
interpretation
further
the
in
significant
The first meaningful case which addressed the 1974 amendments
was Red Bank Board of Education v. Warrington.5 3 In Red Bank,
the teachers' association sought arbitration after the board of education
assigned twenty-nine primary level teachers an additional period
while the teachers' regular classes were being taught by other teaching specialists.54 The board argued that this decision involved a
management prerogative not subject to negotiation. 55 Initially, the
appellate court found "a clear legislative intent [from the 1974
amendments] that disputes over contractual terms and conditions of
employment should be solved, if possible, through grievance procedures." 5 6 Inasmuch as the decision to assign the additional period

The commission shall at all times have the power and duty, upon the request
of any public employer or majority representative, to make a determination as to
whether a matter in dispute is within the scope of collective negotiations. The
commission shall serve the parties with its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Any determination made by the commission pursuant to this subsection may be
appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court.
Id. For a discussion of PERC's procedure in scope of negotiation matters, see Tener, supra note
9, at 633-45.
52 See Association of State College Faculties v. New Jersey Bd. of Educ., 66 N.J. 72, 77,
328 A.2d 235, 237-38 (1974), where the court took notice of the amendments and their importance in light of the Dunellen decisions. See also the specific statutory authority relied upon in
the Dunellen decisions that was amended in 1974. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3, 8.1 (West
Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
53 138 N.J. Super. 564, 351 A.2d 778 (App. Div. 1976).
In the first opportunity to address the amendments, the appellate division applied the
Dunellen test to determine that the decision to judge the quality of faculty performance was a
management prerogative beyond the scope of negotiations, without addressing the specific
statutory charge. Clifton Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 136 N.J. Super. 336, 339, 346 A.2d
107, 110 (App. Div. 1975).
54 138 N.J. Super. at 566, 351 A.2d at 780. The former practice of the board was to give the
teachers a free period during this time. Id. As this assignment eliminated this period, the
teachers' association argued that the collective bargaining agreement had been violated, and
requested arbitration as the terminal stage in the grievance procedure. Id. The contractual
provision provided that "[a]ny matter for which a method of review is prescribed by law or any
rule or regulation of the State Commissioner of Education or any matter which according to law
is either beyond the scope of Board authority or limited to action by the Board alone." Id.
(emphasis omitted).
'5 The board alleged that the change was exempt from arbitration as the decision to eliminate the free period was " 'limited to action by the Board alone.' " Id. at 568, 351 A.2d at 781
(citation omitted).
56 Id. at 572, 351 A.2d at 783. The court found that the 1974 amendments to sections 8.1
and 5.3 had provided the necessary clarification which the Dunellen court had sought. Id.
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directly affected the teachers' workload, and as such, involved a term
and condition of employment, the court reversed the law division and
directed the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the
contractual provision. 57 Thus, the court extended jurisdiction over
grievances concerning negotiable terms and conditions, previously
held by the Commissioner of Education under Title 18A, 58 to the arbitrator designated in the collective bargaining agreement. In so holding, the court recognized that the purpose of the 1974 amendment
was to alter the court's previous deference to Title 18A. 59
In Union County Board of Education v. Union County Teachers'
Association, 60 the court recognized that under certain circumstances
Title 18A would preclude the right to negotiate when the subject
matter was clearly a management prerogative. 61 Narrowing the
applicability of the Red Bank decision, the court in Union County
held that local boards of education were free to reduce their person62
nel by not renewing contracts made with nontenured teachers.
Similarly, in In re Board of Education, 63 the appellate division found
that "[t]he determination not to renew the contract of a nontenured
teacher is a discretionary matter for the local board, and where it
results from a reduction in the force there exists no right of reemployment."''
Basing its finding on the concept of management

57 Id. at 574, 351 A.2d at 784. The court, however, was careful to note that the decision
involved controversies between teachers and the Commissioner of Education, refusing to consider the 1974 amendment's effect upon disputes between teachers and boards of education. Id.
at 572, 351 A.2d at 783.
58 Id. at 574, 351 A.2d at 784. In a similar decision, another appellate division court held
that the board's right to select candidates for promotions was a managerial prerogative outside
the scope of negotiation. Board of Educ. v. North Bergen Fed'n of Teachers, 141 N.J. Super.
97, 357 A.2d 302 (App. Div. 1976). Instead, the court found that the board is permitted to
establish its own criteria for promotion even to the point of selecting candidates for advancement outside the school district. The court held that "[t]he board, in seeking the best qualified
candidates for promotions, should not be restricted in its search for the faculty of the North
Bergen schools." Id. at 103, 357 A.2d at 305.
59 138 N.J. Super. at 572, 351 A.2d at 783. Although Title 18A appears to be a specific
provision, the court preferred to classify it as general, thus negating any possible preemptive
effect of Title 18A. Id.
60 145 N.J. Super. 435, 368 A.2d 364 (App. Div. 1976).
61 Id. at 437-38, 368 A.2d at 365.
62 Id. at 437, 368 A.2d at 365. The court noted that the contract between the board and the
teachers' association "contained no provisions whatever for reductions in force" and the
reemployment rights of teachers so affected are not visible. Id.
6 In re Board of Educ., 150 N.J. Super. 265, 270, 375 A.2d 669, 672 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 75 N.J. 525, 384 A.2d 505 (1977).
Id. at 270, 375 A.2d at 672. The dispute arose when a school had to be closed for financial reasons and some forty non-tenured teachers were put out of work. Id. at 267, 375 A.2d at
670.
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discretion, the court fbund this subject matter to be outside the scope
of mandatory negotiability. 65
Another decision which addressed the amendments' effect upon
other laws of the state was Taureck v. City of Jersey City. 66 This
case involved an action by municipal firemen. who sought to obtain
credit for prior service with other municipalities which would be a
factor in computing their vacation pay, longevity pay, and retroactive
8
backpay. 6 7 In light of a narrow reading of the 1974 amendments, 6
the court found compensation not to be one of the terms and conditions of employment subject to negotiation within the statute. 69 The
court noted that the appellate division had found, in a previous case
interpreting the statute, that the ambiguous 1974 amendment could
not divest the Civil Service Commission's "traditional and statutory
authority over issues affecting the rights of civil service employees
" 70
including policemen and firemen ....
In In re Byram Township Board of Education, 71 the appellate
division found that the 1974 amendments did not cut back on the
Dunellen Trilogy and that PERC should determine the scope of

65 Id. at 270, 375 A.2d at 672. In addition, the court held the statutory power to reduce the
size of the faculty as found in section 18A:28-9 "cannot be the subject of negotiation or arbitration." Id. at 271, 375 A.2d at 672.
66 149 N.J. Super. 503, 374 A.2d 70 (Law Div. 1977).
67 Id. at 506-07, 374 A.2d at 71. The plaintiff relied upon section 40A:9-5, which provides
that:
Wherever heretofore or hereafter a transfer has been or shall be effected by appointment, assignment or promotion of a municipal employee to any other department or position in municipal employment, . . . the period of such prior service in
said county or municipal employment, for any purpose whatsoever, shall be computed as if the whole period of employment of such employee had been in the
service of the department, or in the position, to which the said employee had been
transferred.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:9-5 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). In response, the defendant argued
that, as the plaintiff's rights concerning prior service credits are governed solely by the collective bargaining agreement of the parties, any protection afforded by the statute does not apply.
149 N.J. Super. at 507-08, 374 A.2d at 72.
68 149 N.J. Super. at 517, 374 A.2d at 76.
69 Id.
at 513, 374 A.2d at 74. More precisely, the court found that the benefits afforded by
Title 40A could not be waived by the parties in a collective bargaining agreement: "'[a]n
employee is clothed with these rights prior to his representatives' engagement in any collective
bargaining." Id. at 513-14, 374 A.2d at 74. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:9-5 (West Cum. Supp.
1979-1980).
70 149 N.J. Super. at 519, 374 A.2d at 77 (citing Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Elizabeth,
146 N.J. Super. 257, 369 A.2d 931 (App. Div. 1977)). Since the court found the Title 40A
statute to control, the plaintiffs were granted the rights and benefits claimed. 149 N.J. Super. at
522, 374 A.2d at 79.
71 152 N.J. Super. 12, 377 A.2d 745 (App. Div. 1977).
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negotiability on a case-by-case basis. 7 2 The Byram Township court
stated that the 1974 amendments "do not reflect a legislative design
to deprive boards of education of their exclusive managerial preroga73 It
tive in matters involving predominantly educational policies."
74
agreed with all but two of PERC's determinations of negotiability,
finding reporting procedures, 75 performance of nonteaching duties, 76
matters relating to work loads, '77 posting of vacancies, 78 and the establishment of facilities for teachers 79 to be terms and conditions of
employment, subject to negotiation and ultimately arbitration.
The final appellate division decision involving the 1974 amendments prior to the Supreme Court of New Jersey's major pronouncements in 1978 was Board of Education v. Piscataway Maintenance &
Custodial Association. 80 In Piscataway, the court held that the general provisions of the amendment should yield to specific sections of
the Education Law that dealt with the same subject. 81 In finding
72 Id. at 18-19, 377 A.2d at 749. The parties sought to determine it certain matters were
within the scope of mandatory negotiation by filing a petition with PERC, pursuant to section
34:13A-5.4(d). Id. at 16, 377 A.2d at 747. See note 51 supra,
73 152 N.J. Super. at 21, 377 A.2d at 750. The court found that the 1974 amendments did
not render the Dunellen Trilogy obsolete. Id. at 22, 377 A.2d at 750.
74 id. at 24-27, 377 A.2d at 752-53. The court suggested that PERC's administrative judgment pertaining to negotiability should be respected, unless the determination isarbitrary or
capricious. Id. at 23-24, 377 A.2d at 751. In this case, the court reversed PERC's determination
that a contractual provision granting teachers a duty-free lunch period, except in emergencies,
was a negotiable term and condition of employment. Id. at 24-25, 377 A.2d at 752. In addition,
the court found that the determination for deciding criteria for promotions was a matter of
"major educational policy" beyond the scope of negotiation, contrary to PERC's interpretation
construing the proposals as steps to be followed in filling vacancies. Id. at 27, 377 A.2d at 753.
75 Id. at 25, 377 A.2d at 752.
76 Id. at 25-26, 377 A.2d at 752.
77Id. at 25, 377 A.2d at 752. In this context, the court cited Board of Educ. v. Englewood
Teachers Ass'n which found working hours and compensation to "[s]urely [be] . .. terms and
conditions of employment within the contemplation of the Employer-Employee Relations Act."
Board of Educ. v. Englewood Teachers Ass'n, 64 N.J. 1, 6-7, 311 A.2d 729, 731 (1973).
78 152 N.J. Super. at 26, 377 A.2d at 753.
79 Id. at 27-30, 377 A.2d at 753-54. These proposals included an air-conditioned work area,
a private pay phone, clean rest rooms with a full-length mirror and adequate off-street parking
facilities for the exclusive use of the faculty. Id. at 28, 377 A.2d at 754.
8o 152 N.J. Super. 235, 377 A.2d 938 (App. Div. 1977). Judge Seidman, who authored this
opinion, also wrote the Red Bank and In re Byram Twp. Bd, of Educ. decisions, discussed at
notes 52-58, 68-76 supra and accompanying text.
81 152 N.J. Super. at 247-49, 377 A.2d at 944-45. A specific section of Title 18A, concerning the procedure that the board was to follow in the case of an absence which exceeded the
annual sick leave of an individual employee stated that:
the board of education may pay any such person each day's salary less the pay of a
substitute, if a substitute is employed or the estimated cost of the employment of a
substitute if none is employed, for such length of time as may be determined by the
board of education in each individual case. A day's salary is defined as 1/200 of the
annual salary.
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that the payment of salary for prolonged absence beyond allowable
sick leave was a matter left to the discretion of local boards of education and not subject to negotiation, 8 2 the court determined that the
legislature, in adopting Chapter 303, "did not contemplate that local
boards of education could or would abdicate their statutorily imposed
management responsibilities." 8 3 Thus, it was concluded that the
judiciary was to decide "on a case-by-case basis how the statutes [title
' 84
18 and the 1974 amendments] may co-exist harmoniously."
As indicated above, the courts at this time demonstrated an unwillingness to expand the impact of the 1974 amendments by generally reaffirming the Dunellen test for negotiability. 85 PERC, however, acting on a suggestion in both Dunellen and Burlington as to
the existence of a permissive category of negotiations, 86 expanded
these categories by developing a tripartite test to determine whether
a particular matter was within the scope of negotiations. PERC classified a subject as a mandatorily negotiable term and condition of
employment, a nonnegotiable management prerogative, or, a permissive subject for negotiations. 87 A permissive subject was viewed

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:30-6 (West 1968) (emphasis added). The board argued that this section,
along with section 18A:30-7, precluded negotiations in this area. 152 N.J. Super. at 239, 377
A.2d at 940. In opposition, the association argued that the statutes supply the board with "discretionary authority" and do not act as a complete bar to negotiation. Id.
82 152 N.J. Super. at 249, 377 A.2d at 945. The court conceded that "sick leave or other
leaves of absence are matters that directly and intimately affect the terms and conditions of
employment," but are nonetheless non-negotiable because of their effect on major educational
policy. Id. at 243-44, 377 A.2d at 943.
83 Id. at 246, 377 A.2d at 944. The court emphasized that the individual was still entitled to
sick leave compensation pay, but only 'for such length of time as may be determined by the
board of education in each individual case." Id. (emphasis in original).
84 Id. at 247, 377 A.2d at 945. Again the court refused to view the 1974 amendments as
constituting the '" strong qualifying statement' ""that the supreme court requested in Dunellen
to give a different interpretation of the statute. Id. (citation omitted).
85 Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 31, 311 A.2d 737, 744
(1973); Burlington County College Faculty Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 64 N.J. 10, 14, 311 A.2d
733, 735 (1973).
86 Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 32, 311 A.2d 737, 744
(1973); Burlington County College Faculty Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 64 N.J. 10, 16, 311 A.2d
733, 736 (1973).
87 See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 19:13-3.7 (1977), codifying PERC's tripartite scheme, which
is
nearly the same as that used by the NLRB in the private sector. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of
Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-50 (1958). In this case, Justice Burton, speaking for five
members of the Court, found that a permissive category of negotiations existed in the private
sector in which "each party is free to bargain or not to bargain, and to agree or not to agree."
356 U.S. at 349. The classification of a subject is significant as the duties and obligations of the
employer and employee differ according to which category the subject falls under. Id.
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as one that the parties may negotiate, although negotiating to the
point of impasse was not required, as would be the case in a mandatorily negotiable term and condition of employment. 88 Parties
would be free to negotiate on permissive subjects and incorporate any
agreement upon areas of concern into the contract. 89 Although there
was no explicit support for the creation of a permissive category in
the 1974 amendments, 90 PERC determined the following items to be
included as permissive subjects for negotiation; selection of school
administrators, 91 teacher evaluation criteria, 92 qualifications for hiring, 93 and involuntary teacher transfers. 94 Until the Supreme Court
of New Jersey's decision in Ridgefield Park Education Association v.
Ridgefield Park Board of Education, 95 there was judicial silence concerning the permissive classification, suggesting a sanctioning of
PERC's tripartite scheme. 96
The Supreme Court's Response: State Supervisory Employees Association and Ridgefield Park
In State v. State Supervisory Employees Association, 9 7 Justice
Pashman, speaking for a unanimous court, specifically addressed the
issue of how the 1974 amendment to section 34:13A-8.1 affected the
88 Bridgewater-Raritan Regional Bd. of Educ., 3 N.J.P.E.R. 23, 24 (1976). In this case,
PERC held that the decision not to renew the contract of a nontenured teacher constituted a
major educational policy, but could be permissively negotiated by the parties. Id.
89 Id. If one party decided, however, not to negotiate on a permissive subject, that party
could not be forced to negotiate to the point of impasse. In fact, a charge of refusing to
negotiate in good faith could be brought against either party who was to insist, to the point of
impasse, as to the inclusion of a permissive subject in contract negotiations. City of Jersey City,
3 N.J.P.E.R. 66, 68 (1977).
90 See Local 195, International Fed'n of Professional & Technical Eng'rs, 3 N.J.P.E.R. 116
(1977), rev'd sub nom. State v. State Supervisory Employees, 78 N.J. 54, 393 A.2d 233 (1978),
in which PERC, although unable to produce the specific legislative history to support its position, found that the 1974 amendments were a legislative response to Dunellen's suggestion that
a permissive category of negotiations could exist between employers and employees. Id. at 121.
91 Rutgers, The State University, 2 N.J.P.E.R. 13 (1976).
92 Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 3 N.J.P.E.R. 303 (1977), rev'd sub nom. Ridgefield Park
Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 393 A.2d 278 (1978).
93 Byram Township Bd. of Educ., 2 N.J.P.E.R. 143 (1976), modified, 152 N.J. Super. 12,
377 A.2d 745 (App. Div. 1977).
94 Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 3 N.J.P.E.R. 319 (1977), rev'd sub nom. Ridgefield Park
Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 393 A.2d 278 (1978).
95 78 N.J. 144, 393 A.2d 278 (1978).
96 See In re Byram Twp. Bd. of Educ., 152 N.J. Super. 12, 377 A.2d 745 (App. Div. 1977),
which held that PERC, as the administrative agency charged with implementing the Act, should
be afforded " 'a broad and flexible latitude of interpretation of the statute .... Id. at 23, 377
A.2d at 751.
97 78 N.J. 54, 393 A.2d 233 (1978).
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scope of collective negotiations in the public sector of New Jersey. 98
Fearful for their job security because of large-scale layoffs of union
members at the Department of Transportation, 9 9 Local 195 of the
International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers
(IFPTE) and Local 518 of the Service Employees International Union
(SEIU) sought to negotiate their seniority rights with respect to
layoffs, recall, bumping, and re-employment with the State before the
contract expired on June 30, 1975. 100 The State, arguing that these
issues involved managerial prerogatives that were controlled by
specific Civil Service statutes, refused to negotiate. After filing a joint
petition for a scope of negotiations determination with PERC, 101
PERC ordered the State to negotiate seniority as it relates to layoffs,
recall, bumping, and re-employment rights. 102 The supreme court
granted the State's motion for direct certification after both the State
and the Locals appealed PERC's determination to the appellate division. 103
In the accompanying appeal before the court, 104 the Association
requested approval to negotiate proposals relating to the examination
process, promotion, and evaluation layoff procedures utilized by the
Civil Service Commission. 105 After the State refused to negotiate
these matters, 106 the parties filed a joint petition for certification with
9s Id. at 60, 393 A.2d at 236. The court was also concerned with the validity of negotiations
on hiring and promotional procedures, as such negotiation could potentially be precluded by
article VII, section one, paragraph two of New Jersey's constitution, which provides that appointments and promotions be based on "a merit and fitness system." Id.
99 Id. at 60-61, 393 A.2d at 236.
100Id.
101 Id. See note 51 supra.
102 78 N.J. at 63, 393 A.2d at 236-37. PERC found that the amendments worked a limited
expansion of the scope of negotiations, noting that the amendments
mean[t] that general statutes giving authority to employers are not to be read as
shields to the employer's obligation to negotiate regarding terms and conditions of
employment, but specific statutes governing terms and conditions of employment
cannot be abrogated by collective negotiations.
Id. at 62, 393 A.2d at 237 (citations omitted). As the items in question were not governed by a
specific statute, PERC found them to be negotiable. Id. at 63, 393 A.2d at 237.
'o- 76 N.J. 231, 386 A.2d 856 (1978). The case consists of two separate appeals: first, State v.
Local 195, Int'l Fed. of Professional & Technical Engineers and second, State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass'n.
104 State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass'n, 78 N.J. at 63, 393 A.2d at 237.
105 Id. at 62, 393 A.2d at 236. These proposals included provisions for the procedure concerning eligibility and the elements of the promotional and competitive examination for state
employees, as well as the procedure and effect of layoffs on employees. 78 N.J. at 63-464, 393
A.2d at 237-38.
106 Id. The state argued that all the proposals "concern[ed] fundamental managerial policies
entrusted by the Legislature to the Civil Service Commission." Id. at 64, 393 A.2d at 238.
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PERC. 10 7 PERC relied on its holding in Local 195 that the parties
must negotiate these items. 108 After the parties appealed PERC's
decision to the appellate division, the supreme court granted certification of this case and consolidated it with the appeal of Local 195
and Local 518.109

In authoring the State Supervisory Employees Association decision, Justice Pashman analyzed the various interpretations concerning
the effect of the 1974 amendment to section 34:13A-8.1. 110 Noting
that the "1974 amendment to N.J.S.A. 34:13A-8.1 is ambiguous and
the legislative intent is less than clear,"" ' Justice Pashman agreed

107 See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 19:12-2.1, where PERC is authorized to make such determinations. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
108 PERC found that "[t]he instant parties will be required to negotiate regarding terms and

conditions of employment within the framework of the lawful authority of the public employer."
3 N.J.P.E.R. at 138, 141 (1977). The only proposals that PERC found to be non-negotiable
were: the one providing that "[p]romotional examinations must be administered within ninety
(90) days of the provisional appointment of an employee" and the proposal that "[t]he State shall
eliminate any employee rating other than 'satisfactory' or 'unsatisfactory.' " 78 N.J. at 64, 393
A.2d at 238. PERC held that these items "did not involve terms and conditions of employment." Id. at 65, 393 A.2d at 238.
109 76 N.J. 231, 386 A.2d 856 (1978). The court, however, denied the state's motion for
consolidation of these cases with the appeals in Englewood Teachers Ass'n v. Englewood Educ.
Ass'n, 75 N.J. 525, 384 A.2d 505 (1978) and Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefleld Park Bd.
of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 393 A.2d 278 (1978).
110 78 N.J. at 72-79, 393 A.2d at 242-45. The court analyzed the amendment in terms of
three views on the addition of the word "pension" to section 34:13A-8.1. First, the court reviewed PERC's interpretation, which provided "that while proposals concerning terms and conditions of employment are mandatorily negotiable, the parties may agree only to contractual
terms which are within the minima and maxima set by specific statutes." 78 N.J. at 72, 393
A.2d at 242. In short, PERC felt that specific statutes always pre-empted any negotiated
agreement on the same subject. Id. Second, the court analyzed the state's view of the amendment, which was that it had "no effect whatsoever on the Dunellen trilogy" as it was not
clothed in the " 'clear and distinct phraseology' " which Dunellen mandated. Id. at 75, 393 A.2d
at 243. Finally, the court analyzed the Local's view, under which "only negotation concerning
matters covered by pension statutes" were non-negotiable, with every other item being within
the scope of negotiation. Id. at 77, 393 A.2d at 244.
111 Id. at 79, 393 A.2d at 245. The court rejected the state's narrow interpretation of the
statute after reviewing the intense legislative battle over the addition of the word "pension." In
addition, the court concluded that section 11:5-1(f), which directs the Civil Service Commission
to "establish procedures for maintaining adequate employer-employee relations," N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 11:5-1(f) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980), "would automatically preclude the negotiability
of all items within its scope" if such a view was accepted. 78 N.J. at 76, 393 A.2d at 244. To
find such a legislative intent, the court concluded, "is at best unrealistic." Id. The court also
rejected the expansive interpretation of the Locals, noting that such a finding:
would permit total diversity in the terms and conditions of employment for each
public employee negotiating unit in the State. Matters now governed by specific
statute would be regulated only by the negotiated agreement of the public
employer and the majority representative. Civil Service statutes and regulations
could be abrogated entirely if the parties so agreed. Areas where state-wide unifor-
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with PERC's view that a "negotiated agreement with respect to matters beyond the lawful authority of the public employer is impermissible."112 The court differentiated between specific and general statutes and found that a negotiated agreement which contravened a
specific statute would exceed the employer's authority and would
hence be unenforceable and illegal. 113 Mandatory negotiations may
occur, however, in regard to a general statute "over particular terms
and conditions of employment as to which the Civil Service Commis1 14
sion could have but has not enacted preemptive regulations.Thus, the court solved the dilemma of establishing the effect of the
1974 amendment on the scope of negotiations in New Jersey by permitting negotiations regarding terms and conditions of employment
except when a specific statute established nonnegotiable terms and
conditions of employment. 115 In addition, the court found that
"[w]here a statute sets both a maximum and a minimum level of
employee rights or benefits, mandatory negotiation is required concerning any proposal for a level of protection fitting between and including such maximum and minimum."' 116 The court reasoned that
its holding was in accord with the practices in the field and that when
a matter is specifically exempted by a Civil Service regulation, the
party's best remedy "is to seek a modification of such regulation
through the administrative process, . . . [and] even petition the
Legislature where a particular term and condition of employment is
1 17
controlled by a statute with which they disagree."

mity has been deemed a necessity would simply break down into a mass of confusion.
Id. at 79, 393 A.2d at 245.
112 78 N.J. at 79, 393 A.2d at 245. The court, however, was aware of the legislative struggle
for the change and noted that "the 1974 amendment to N.J.S.A. 34:13A-8.1 was not an empty
gesture." Id. at 80, 393 A.2d at 246.
113 Id. at 81-82, 393 A.2d at 246-47. The court found that "[it must be emphasized ...
that
the adoption of any specific statute or regulation setting or controlling a particular term or
condition of employment will preempt any inconsistent provision of a negotiated agreement
governing that previously unregulated matter." Id. at 81, 393 A.2d at 246 (emphasis in original).
114 Id. at 80-81, 393 A.2d at 246. For example, the court noted that:
[t]here are many areas in which the (Civil Service) Commission has not sought to
comprehensively regulate the terms and conditions of public employment ....
The
Legislature has determined that collective negotiation concerning such nonregulated
terms and conditions of public employment should be mandatory and any
negotiated agreement thereon valid.
ld.
115 Id. at 81-82, 393 A.2d at 246.
116 Id. at 82, 393 A.2d at 247.
117

Id.
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In the remainder of the opinion, the court considered the various
issues in dispute. 118 In the case of Local 195, the court found that
the possibility of seniority as it relates to layoffs, recalls, bumping,
re-employment, and reinstatement rights was preempted by specific
statute and regulation. 119 Even though it was conceded that the subjects all related to terms and conditions of employment, since "[n]othing more directly and intimately affects a worker than the fact of
whether or not he has a job,"' 120 the court nevertheless found the
Civil Service regulations to preempt their negotiability and therefore
reversed PERC's findings.121
As for the issues raised by the State Supervisory Employees Association, the court again found all of the items to constitute terms
and conditions of employment, but generally disagreed with PERC
concerning their negotiability, finding the issues to be controlled by
administrative regulations. 122 These issues included matters con-

cerning layoffs,
tests. 125

123

promotional procedures,

124

and competitive

158 In addition, the court outlined the correct procedure that is to be followed in these scope
of negotiations proceedings, noting that "PERC is the forum for the initial determination of
whether a matter in dispute is within the scope of collective negotiations" pursuant to the
authority of section 34:13A-5.4(d). 78 N.J. at 83, 393 A.2d at 247. See note 51 supra.
11978 N.J. at 84, 393 A.2d at 248. The specific statutes and regulations relevant to this case
were: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 11:13-2 (West 1976) (concerning computation of seniority credits to
determine layoffs); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 11:15-9 (West 1976) (concerning reemployment rights);
and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 11:15-10 (West 1976) (concerning reinstatement rights). In addition, the
court found that the administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to these sections, such as
section 4:1-16.3 (concerning layoff procedures) of the New Jersey Administrative Code, also
preempted regulations in these areas. 78 N.J. at 84-86, 393 A.2d at 248-49. PERC viewed such
regulations as not having the pre-emptive effect of a statute. Id.
120 78 N.J. at 84, 393 A.2d at 248.
121 Id. at 86-87, 393 A.2d at 249. Again, the key difference between the court's holding and
PERC's determination is the different perception of Civil Service regulations. PERC found that
such regulations do not preempt the negotiability of a certain topic, while the court found that
"'there is nothing upon which the parties could agree concerning these matters, as they
are
comprehensively regulated by statute and Civil Service rule." Id.
122 Id. at 87-98, 393 A.2d at 249-55.
123 Id. at 87-90, 393 A.2d at 249-51. Some of the procedures for layoffs were controlled by
sections of the New Jersey Administrative Code, and hence no agreement could be made without contravening a regulation. 78 N.J. at 87, 373 A.2d at 249. For example, N.J. ADMIN. CODE
§ 4:16(3)(b) recognizes state service as the sole factor to be considered in determining layoffs.
Id.
124 In reaching this issue, the court distinguished between promotional criteria, such as qualifications for a position, and promotional procedures, such as the posting of notice of vacancies
for certain positions. In finding the former to be not mandatorily negotiable and the latter to be
so, the court again emphasized the preemptive effect of administrative guidelines and overturned PERC's findings as to a proposal's negotiability. 78 N.J. at 92-93, 393 A.2d at 252.
125 Id. at 94-96, 393 A.2d at 253-54. Although finding that these proposals "intimately and
directly affects employees," the court held that negotiations on the procedure and eligibility for
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In Ridgefield Park Education Association v. Ridgefield Park
Board of Education, another case concerning the scope of negotiations, decided the same day as State Supervisory Employees Association, 126 the supreme court considered whether the 1974 amendments
to the Act "created a class of permissively negotiable matters which,
while not qualifying as mandatorily negotiable terms and conditions of
employment, are nevertheless negotiable on a voluntary basis." 127
Teachers in the Ridgefield Park school district had been either involuntarily reassigned grades or courses or had been transferred to
other schools in the district. 128 The Association had filed grievances
for all teachers so -affected. 129 After having the board deny these
grievances, the Association filed for binding arbitration of their grievances, pursuant to their contractual agreement. 130 The chancery
division judge ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration. 131 After
filing for a scope determination and having PERC hold that the matters were negotiable and arbitrable, 132 the supreme court granted
certification.

133

such tests remained a managerial prerogative not subject to negotiation. Id. at 95, 393 A.2d at
253.
126 78 N.J. 144, 393 A.2d 278 (1978).
127 Id. at 149, 393 A.2d at 280. The court again was concerned with PERC's expansive interpretation of the 1974 amendments by noting that "[tihe Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) has concluded that such a permissive category indeed exists." Id.
128 Id. at 149-50, 393 A.2d at 280-81. Both parties agreed that no factual dispute existed in
this
case. Id.
129 Id. On the day after its decision in Ridgefield Park, the court delivered an opinion that
outlined the correct procedure that is to be followed in determining the means of resolving a
grievance, as was the case in Ridgefield Park. In Township of West Windsor v. PERC, 78 N.J.
98, 393 A.2d 255 (1978), Justice Pashman found that the amendments to the statute made "the
scope of mandatory grievability .. . [the] substantial equivalent to the scope of mandatory
negotiability." Id. at 107, 393 A.2d at 259. The only difference in the mechanism of the two
systems that the court found was that an alleged conflict of a statute and a particular grievance
procedure does not preclude the grievability of a dispute, as it would in the scope of negotiations finding. 78 N.J. at 149-50, 393 A.2d at 280-81.
130 Id. at 151, 393 A.2d at 282. The contract defined a grievance as:
[Tihe term, "grievance," means a complaint by an employee, group of employees,
or the Association, that, as to him, there has been an inequitable, improper, or
unjust application, interpretation, or violation of a policy, agreement, or administrative decision.
78 N.J. at 149-50, 393 A.2d at 280. In addition, the collective bargaining agreement provided
for binding arbitration as the final stage in the grievance procedure. Id.
131 Id. at 151, 393 A.2d at 281. An adverse opinion against the Board of Education for an
order enjoining arbitration of the grievances was filed on March 4, 1977. Id.
132 Id.
PERC relied on its decisions in Bridgewater-Raritan Regional Bd. of Educ., 3
N.J.P.E.R. 23 (1976) and Board of Educ. of City of Trenton, 2 N.J.P.E.R. 351 (1976) which
"mandated a conclusion that the matters in issue, though permissive and not mandatorily negotiable would be arbitrable if otherwise within the contractual arbitration clause." id.
.3 75 N.J. 584, 384 A.2d 815 (1977). The supreme court granted direct certification while
the case was pending in the appellate division. In addition, the court consolidated this case with
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Before reaching the merits of the case, the court outlined the
correct procedure to be followed when seeking to determine the
negotiability and ultimate arbitrability of a topic. 134 It noted that
"[w]hen one party claims that a given dispute is arbitrable under the
contract and the other party resists arbitration, the party desiring arbitration should seek an order from the superior court compelling
arbitration." 13 5 The court also affirmed PERG's primary jurisdiction
to determine if a particular issue is within the scope of negotiations. 136 If PERC finds that a matter is not within the scope of
negotiation, it is not arbitrable. 137 If it is negotiable, the matter can
proceed to arbitration, where "the arbitrator will reach the merits and
render an award."1 38 The decision of the arbitrator can be confirmed
in the superior court if one of the parties does not abide by it. 139
Justice Pashman, writing for a majority of the court, initially reaffirmed the Dunellen test for negotiable terms and conditions of
employment and found teacher transfers to be a negotiable term and
condition. 140 Nevertheless, as its negotiability "would significantly
interfere with a public employer's discharge of inherent managerial
responsibilities," the court found it not to be mandatorily negotiable. 141
the pending appeal in Englewood Teachers Ass'n v. Englewood Bd. of Educ., 75 N.J. 525, 384
A.2d 505 (1978).
134Concerned with the incorrect procedures followed by the parties in this case, the court
outlined the correct procedure that is to be followed in any dispute over arbitrability, noting the
district functions of PERC, the superior court and the arbitrator. 78 N.J. at 153-56, 393 A.2d at
282-83.
135 Id. at 153, 393 A.2d at 282. If the judge decides that the matter does not involve contractual arbitrability, he should not make a decision on the scope of negotiability. Id. at 153-54, 393
A.2d at 282.
136 Id. at 154, 393 A.2d at 282. The court emphasized the limited scope of PERC, affirming
PERC's determination that scope of negotiations questions are all that PERC is authorized to
handle pursuant to section 34:13A-54(d). Id.
137 Id. at 154, 393 A.2d at 283. The court also approved PERC's authority to suspend arbitration during scope of determinations and PERC's power to issue an injunction when it determines that a matter is outside the scope of negotiations. Id. at 154-55, 393 A.2d at 283. See also
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.4(f) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980), which authorizes PERC to
make such a determination.
138 78 N.J. at 155, 393 A.2d at 283.
139 Id. Likewise, the court authorized an appeal directly to the appellate division when a
party disagrees with PERC's determination. Id.
140 Id. at 156, 393 A.2d at 283-84 (citing State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass'n, 78 N.J.
at 67, 393 A.2d at 239, discussed in notes 94-122 supra and accompanying text). Using the
phraseology of two of the Dunellen cases, the court noted that negotiable terms and conditions
of employment are "'those matters which intimately and directly affect the work and welfare of
public employees and on which negotiated agreement would not significantly interfere with the
exercise of inherent managerial prerogative pertaining to the determination of governmental
policy." Id. at 156, 393 A.2d at 283-84.
141 78 N.J. at 156, 293 A.2d at 283-84. The court emphasized the potential effect that such
negotiations could have upon personnel policy, which is essential "to promote the overall goal of
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Justice Pashman then considered the arguments of PERC as to
why a permissive category of negotiations existed. 142 Initially, PERC
pointed out that in adopting the 1974 amendments, the legislature
had also created a commission to study and make recommendations
on public sector collective negotiations and thereby implicitly approved permissive negotiation. 143 The court, however, stated that
legislative authorization of permissive topics of arbitration was not indicated by the mere establishment of the committee, and certainly
did not provide the " 'clear and distinct phraseology' " necessary to
justify a change of the law that the court had announced in Dunellen. 144
In another argument, PERC cited the recently enacted Police
and Firemen Interest Arbitration Act, 145 which specifically authorizes
a permissive category of negotiations. 146 This argument was found to
be unpersuasive to the court for a number of reasons. First, the court
noted that the constitutionality of interest arbitration on permissive
topics remained a separate question which the court did not need to
address at that time. 147 In addition, the court found that the legislature's need to include the permissive category in that statute lends
credence to the argument that such a category would not exist unless
it was specifically provided for other employees. 148
providing all students with a thorough and efficient education." id. This rationale originates
from the aforementioned illegal delegation theory discussed in note 2 supra and accompanying
text.
142 Id. at 157-62, 393 A.2d at 284-87.
143Id. at 157, 393 A.2d at 284-85. The commission was directed to determine if
[i]t is necessary and desirable either to define the phrase 'terms and conditions of
employment' as used in section 7 of the 1968 act [N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3]
and, in so doing, specify what subjects are mandatory, voluntary or illegal within
the scope of bargaining or of grievance arbitration, or to require that procedural
guidelines be established for determining the same.
L. 1974, c. 124 § 3(c).
14478 N.J. at 157, 393 A.2d at 284.
145 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-14 to -21 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
14678 N.J. at 158, 393 A.2d at 284. The sections which permit such permissive negotiation
provide that:
Factfindings shall be limited to those issues that are within the required scope of
negotiations unless the parties to the factfinding agree to factfinding on permissive
subjects of negotiation.
Arbitration shall be limited to those subjects that are within the required scope of
collective negotiations, except that the parties may agree to submit to arbitration
one or more permissive subjects of negotiation.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-16(b), 16(f)(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). These portions of the
statute, however, specifically applied to only police and firemen. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:13A-16(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
147 78 N.J. at 158, 393 A.2d at 285.
148 Id.
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PERC further argued that years of private sector precedent upheld the existence of a permissive category. 149 The court found that,
while private sector precedent should guide the interpretation of the
PERC law regarding unfair labor practices, "this is not true with respect to the scope of negotiability." 150 Justice Pashman "specifically
caution[ed] PERC and the appellate division of the limited relevance
of private sector precedents with respect to scope-of-negotiations de15 1
terminations."
Finally, PERC argued that, by expanding the scope of grievable
subjects, the 1974 amendment indicated that a category of permissive
topics existed. 152 The court stated that the scope of grievability was
defined by the scope of negotiability, not vice versa. 153 In other
words, it was determined that the first task is to define negotiability
and from that determination will flow the scope of grievability. 154
The court concluded that PERC's emphasis on the 1974 amendments ignored significant sections of the Dunellen Trilogy that involved "more fundamental, constitutionally-rooted considerations of
policy" going beyond mere statutory interpretation. 155 For example,
in the last section of the opinion, Justice Pashman described the serious problems posed by the existence of a permissive category of
negotiable topics:
149 Id. The court specifically referred to NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356
U.S. 342, discussed at note 87 supra, in which the United States Supreme Court considered
the viability of a permissive category of negotiations in the private sector.
150 78 N.J. at 159 n.2, 393 A.2d at 285 n.2.
151 Id. The court emphasized the legislative intent to limit the relevance of federal precedents in public sector scope of negotiations proceedings, citing Lullo v. Fire FightersLocal 1066
stating:
It is crystal clear that in using the term "collective negotiations" [as opposed to
the NLRA's "collective bargaining, see 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1971)] the Legislature intended to recognize inherent limitations on the bargaining power of public
employer and employee, . . .[and] signified an effort to make public employers and
employees realize that the process of collective bargaining as understood in the
private employment sector cannot be transplanted into the public service.
78 N.J. at 159, 393 A.2d at 285 (quoting Lullo v. Fire Fighters Local 1066, 55 N.J. 409, 440,
262 A.2d 681, 698 (1970)).
152 78 N.J. at 159-60, 393 A.2d at 285. PERC reasoned that, as the 1974 amendment to
section 34:13A-5.3 "mandates that grievance procedures negotiated by the parties supersede any
mechanism for the resolution of disputes provided by any statute," a permissive category was
intended by the legislature. Id. at 159-60, 393 A.2d at 285.
15 Id.
15 Id. The court also rejected PERC's argument in this instance as Justice Pashman found
that PERC overlooked significant policy considerations relied on by the court in the Dunellen
trilogy. Id.
155 Id. at 160-61, 393 A.2d at 286. The court was concerned that negotiation in all areas
which affect terms and conditions of public employment would be inconsistent with the legislative mandate of "community involvement in educational decisions" which is mandated by section 18A:7A-2. Id. at 161, 393 A.2d at 286.
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[T]he very foundation of representative democracy would be endangered if decisions on significant matters of governmental policy
were left to the process of collective negotiations, where citizen
participation is precluded. This Court would be most reluctant to
sanction collective agreement on matters which are essentialy managerial in nature, because the true managers are the people. Our
democratic system demands that governmental bodies retain their
accountability to the citizenry. 156
Thus, the court reaffirmed the Dunellen Trilogy by holding that there
are only two categories of topics in public sector negotiationsrequired and illegal. 157 The Ridgefield Park Board of Education had
acted in excess of its authority by agreeing to a contract provision
1 58
limiting its managerial prerogatives regarding teacher transfers.
The clause, therefore, was invalid and unenforceable. 159
In a separate dissent and concurrence, Judge Conford agreed
with PERC that the 1974 amendments were intended to create a
permissive class of negotiations. 160 Judge Conford believed, however, that although a public employer may negotiate such permissive
items, 161 "it may not agree to binding arbitration of a dispute with
respect to a negotiated item if so doing would transfer the making of
an inherent managerial decision from a governmental official to an
arbitrator."1 62 As such a transfer of power would occur in this case,
Judge Conford agreed with the majority that arbitration of teacher
transfers and reassignments should be permanently enjoined. 163

156 Id. at 163, 393 A.2d at 287.
157Id. at 162, 393 A.2d at 287. The court recognized the potential for legislative change in
this area and found that:
The Legislature is of course free to exercise its judgment in determining whether or
not a permissive category of negotiation is sound policy. We wish merely to point
out the careful consideration of the limits which our democratic system places on
delegation of government powers is called for before any such action is taken.
Id. at 165-66, 393 A.2d at 288-89.
158Id. at 166, 393 A.2d at 289.
159 id.

16oId. at 167, 393 A.2d at 289.

Judge Conford felt that the Dunellen Trilogy, which prohibited permissive negotiations,
was countermanded by the 1974 amendments to the Act for two reasons; first, the addition of
the word "pension" to section 34:13A-8.1 and second, the change in section 34:13A-5.3, which
found that "grievance procedures established by agreement of the parties should be utilized
notwithstanding any procedures for the resolution of disputes, controversies or grievances established by any other statute." Id. at 169-70, 393 A.2d at 290-91 (Conford, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Parenthetically Judge Conford noted that the language used in section
34:13A-5.3 was "an obvious allusion to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Education over
school controversies.'" Id.at 170, 393 A.2d at 291.
162 Id. at 167, 393 A.2d at 289.
16 Id. at 173, 393 A.2d at 292.
161
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Thus, in State Supervisory Employees Association, the supreme
court significantly curtailed PERC's determination that the Civil Service Commission's regulations could be modified, if necessary, to conform with the negotiated agreement between the state and the public
employer. 164 Instead, the court determined that the regulations of
the Civil Service Commission have the same preemptive effect on
negotiated agreements as do specific statutes. 165 In Ridgefield Park,
the court emphasized that since the ambiguous language of the 1974
amendments was insufficient to conclude that the legislature had approved permissive topics of negotiability, there were only the two
categories of subjects for negotiation in the public sector. 166
Decisions subsequent to State Supervisory Employees Association and Ridgefield Park, have consistently affirmed the holdings in
these cases. 167 In Bernards Township Board of Education v. Bernards Township Education Association, 168 Justice Pashman, writing
for an unanimous court, found that a collective bargaining agreement
which attempted to substitute an arbitrator's judgment for a Commissioner of Education's decision to withhold a salary increment was an
ultra vires act which would be unenforceable. 169 Using the same
16

78 N.J. at 86, 393 A.2d at 249.

165 Id.
166 78 N.J. at 162, 393 A.2d at 287. With this determination, the court cut back on PERC's
finding that a permissive category did in fact exist. See notes 89-98 supra and accompanying
text.
167 See, e.g., New Jersey State Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n Local 29 v. Town of Irvington,
80 N.J. 271, 403 A.2d 473 (1979), where the court held that the decision to reduce personnel
for budgetary reasons was "clearly 'inherent management prerogatives pertaining to the determination of governmental policy.' " 80 N.J. at 296, 403 A.2d at 485. Similarly, in In re
Maywood Bd. of Educ., 168 N.J. Super. 45, 401 A.2d 711 (App. Div. 1979), the court held that
reductions in the work force of a school system and the impact of such reductions was a nonnegotiable item. It was stated that "[t]o allow such impact to be negotiated would indirectly
contravene the Dunellen analysis which was so strongly reaffirmed in Ridgefield Park." 168 N.J.
Super. at 58, 401 A.2d at 717.
168 79 N.J. 311, 399 A.2d 620 (1979).
169 79 N.J. at 322, 399 A.2d at 626. The dispute arose over the interpretation of a clause in

the collective bargaining agreement which provided that:
An employment or adjustment increment [in salary for any teacher] may be withheld [by the Board] in whole or in part for inefficiency or other just cause related to
the performance of duties and only in accordance with the following:
4. Any action by the Board to withhold an increment or any part thereof shall be
subject to appeal to arbitration. The arbitrator shall have the authority to advise the
restoration of all or part of the increment withheld. ...
Id. at 314, 399 A.2d at 622. A principal decided to withhold the salary increment of a teacher at
William Annin Junior High School, and the teachers' association filed a grievance on his behalf.
After having this grievance denied by the Board, the association sought arbitration. The Board
argued that the decision to withhold a teacher's increment ""'for inefficiency or other good
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rationale as in Ridgefield Park, the court found that "[s]uch a provision would in effect delegate government policy-making to an individual who is not accountable to the public at large." 170 The court
did, however, endorse the procedure of submitting disputes concerning the applicability of managerial prerogatives to particular
employees to advisory, as opposed to binding, arbitration. 171 The
court reasoned that advisory arbitration was "not detrimental to the
public interest, [and] its utilization may well bring about beneficial
consequences." 172
The court in both State Supervisory Employees Association and
Ridgefield Park gave extensive consideration to the legislative history
and intent of the 1974 amendments. 173 Justice Pashman stated that
it was not the court's function to expand on this intent. 174 The holdings, however, leave the public employee at a decided disadvantage
in regard to the scope of negotiations. 175 Initially, it must be noted
cause,' " as stated in section 18A:29-14, "is a matter of managerial prerogative and hence not
subject to arbitration." 79 N.J. at 315, 399 A.2d at 622. After the trial court granted an injunction enjoining arbitration, which was affirmed by the appellate division in an unpublished opinion, the supreme court granted certification. 77 N.J. 499, 391 A.2d 513 (1978).
170 79 N.J. at 322, 399 A.2d at 626. This rationale of delegating authority to an individual
who lacks public accountability was also utilized in explaining why the Commissioner of Education should be relieved of his statutory duty to review the Board's decision and why this review
process could not be narrowed through agreement of the parties. Id.
171Id. at 324-25, 399 A.2d at 627. The validity of the use of advisory arbitration as a step in
resolving disputes over managerial prerogatives was not reached by the court in either State
Supervisory Employees Association or Ridgefield Park. Advisory arbitration involves a procedure
which is identical to that of binding arbitration, except that the arbitrator's findings and conclusions serve as "an additional source of information" that the Commissioner of Education can use
in resolving disputes over the effect of managerial prerogatives on public employees." 79 N.J. at
325, 399 A.2d at 628.
172 Id. The court also noted that, in addition to the fact that the Commissioner of Education's
statutory duties were not affected by advisory arbitration, such arbitration could be useful as an
"additional source of information" which would be available to help the Commissioner render a
decision. Id.
'" See 78 N.J. at 67--83, 393 A.2d at 239-47; 78 N.J. at 157-62, 393 A.2d at 284-87. See
notes 113-117 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's analysis of the 1974
amendments.
17478 N.J. at 165-66, 393 A.2d at 288-89.
175As Judge Conford noted in his dissent in Ridgefeld Park:
Practical recognition of negotiations in the permissive area has become a fact of life
in the course of actual negotiations of collective agreements throughout the State in
recent years and the validity thereof has been adjudicated in several leading jurisdictions beyond our borders. Today's holding by the Court is therefore a backward
step in the heretofore progressive development of public sector labor law in this
State which will not conduce toward the legislative policy of promoting peace and
stability in public employment relations.
78 N.J. at 167, 393 A.2d at 289 (Conford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). By not
having a matter subject to negotiations, the public employee is forced to accept the employer's
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that requiring a public employer to bargain collectively over a wide
range of subjects, including permissive topics, does not in itself prejudice the interests of the state. As stated by one commentator, "[t]o
compel bargaining is not to compel agreement."1 76 In addition, the
argument that the public employer would impinge on the sovereign
authority of the state by bargaining on permissive topics is not justified when the competing policy considerations, which the court emphasized in Ridgefield Park, 177 are analyzed. These policy considerations come to light when the two primary distinctions between the
public and private sectors-the strike proscription and the nature of
the political process-are examined. The strike proscription denies
most public employees a potentially powerful economic weapon
which is available to other employees. 178 In order to compensate for
the loss of this weapon, some adjustments in regard to the duty to
bargain requirements should be made to preserve the necessary proscription. 179 Justice Pashman's endorsement of advisory arbitration
in Bernard's Township to the applicability of management prerogatives to employees, despite its potential positive effects, simply does
not provide sufficient protection to the public employee, as the arbitrator's ultimate findings remain only a suggestion to the employer. 8 0

determination as to the applicability of that non-negotiable item to him, even though that item
may have a substantial effect on the employee.
176 Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV. 885,
933 (1971).
177 78 N.J. at 163, 393 A.2d at 287.
178 Although there is no constitutional guarantee of an absolute right to strike in private
employment, see UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 259
(1949), private sector employees have traditionally been afforded the right to strike. See 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (1971). In the public sector, however, employees have categorically been denied the right to strike. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1971), which excludes the United States government from the definition of "employer" under the National Labor Relations Act. New Jersey
courts have similarly affirmed this "no strike" policy in the public sector. See, e.g., Delaware
River and Bay Auth. v. International Org., 45 N.J. 138, 211 A.2d 789 (1965).
179 The need for legislative reform in this area has been recognized by the appellate division
in In re Newark, 118 N.J. Super. 215, 287 A.2d 183 (App. Div. 1972). The court in this case,
while affirming the convictions of Newark school teachers for violating an injunction, noted that:
It is unfortunate that resort must be had to contempt of court procedure in this
type of situation. Jailing teachers is not the answer to school strikes. The solution is
legislative. Public employees have the right to bargain collectively as to the terms
and conditions of their employment but cannot do so on equal terms with their
employment unit since they have no means of negotiating from a position of
strength. If the present policy prohibiting strikes by public employees is to be continued, machinery for the compulsory settlement of deadlocked labor disputes involving public employees should be established.
Id. at 222, 287 A.2d at 187.
180 79 N.J. at 324, 399 A.2d at 627.
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As for the secondary distinction regarding the nature of the political process, it again must be emphasized that to compel bargaining is
not to compel agreement. 181 The legitimate expectations of public
employees should not be denied by a unilateral determination that an
item, although having a substantial effect on an employee, remains a
nonnegotiable management prerogative. 182 In the final analysis, the
competing policy considerations, which are the ultimate guidelines in
this area, must be thoroughly analyzed before denying negotiating
rights. Furthermore, the public employee should be denied bargaining rights only when there exists substantial and compelling reasons
for such restrictions.
Thomas M. Moore
Edwards, supra note 176, at 933.
182 Because of the nature of the political process, the denial of public employees' bargaining
181

rights has been criticized in recent years. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 176, at 886-87.

